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This master’s thesis aims to examine whether corporate managers and specifically CEOs and 
their identities, influence performance in the companies they lead. The term identity hereby 
refers to a broad set of attributes of a manager, ranging from externally observable 
characteristics such as age or gender, over personal skills such as experience and education to 
generalized characteristics such as attitude towards leadership. Managers, as referred to in this 
thesis, are members of organizations, who are expected to be of sufficient importance to the 
company’s success to be relevant to financial performance; these are CEOs and other managers 
in principal roles. It is found that the identities of managers matter for firm performance in a 
significant and a manifold way. This argumentation is founded on a comprehensive overview 





























In a first step, the present thesis provides an overview of existing literature on the topic and 
aims to connect the wide array of findings to a meaningful framework of general rules to explain 
how and when managers affect performance and other key aspects of companies such as 
strategic policies.  
In a second step, an empirical study is conducted to validate theoretical and previous empirical 
findings.  
In chapter one, existing management literature is reviewed to give a general idea why managers 
and CEOs in particular should be of relevance for firm success. Chapter two gives a profound 
overview of the key aspects of measuring leadership effects on firms. Relevant variables and 
their levels of observability as well as their usefulness are presented according to existing 
literature. Chapter three gives a technical overview of established approaches to measure the 
impact of variables defined in chapter two.  
Chapter four investigates and categorizes research specific theoretical literature, which either 
supports or opposes the assumption of leadership effects on firm performance. Chapter five 
presents empirical results of existing research on various levels of research and interconnects 
them.  
Chapter six investigates specific factors of both managers and firms, which are of particular 
interest in the field of research. Chapter seven explores difficulties and limitations in empirical 
research and presents possible solutions.  
Chapter eight presents an empirical study conducted by the thesis’ author, which in line with 










1. The importance of leadership in organizations  
 
The question, which should be asked right in the beginning is what role leadership plays in 
general for the success of firms. To a major part, management literature is concerned with 
finding approaches to practice leadership in ways most optimal for firm success. However, it 
seldom asks for the fundamental importance of leadership, which is naturally assumed to be 
major.  
 
“We speak of “leadership” and of the “spirit” of an 
organization. But leadership is given by managers and effective primarily within 
management; and the spirit is made by the spirit within the management group. 
We talk of “objectives” for the company and of its performance. But the objectives 
are goals for management people; the performance is management performance. 
And if an enterprise fails to perform, we rightly hire not different workers but a 
new president.” 
Peter Drucker, 1973, p. 29 (revised edition 2008) 
 
This quotation by Peter Drucker, born in 1909 in Vienna and one of the most regarded 
management theorists1, summarizes the natural perception of the importance of leadership in 
respect to firm success in one paragraph. Drucker attributes leadership great importance for 
achieving organizational, or, in particular, firm success. He further elaborates in an earlier work 
that profitability in firms is not a goal to achieve, but rather a test for the legitimacy of behavior 
and decisions of businesses, driven by managers (Drucker, 1954). For sure, firm success is 
caused by other factors except leadership as well, such as economic developments and industry 
specific events. Surely as well, management philosophers would naturally assess management 
an important role in the interplay of factors driving firm performance.  
It is a generally accepted fact that firms themselves have a significant effect on their 
performance, otherwise there would exist no detectable differences among firms within a 
homogenous industry, which, however, is undisputedly the case. If leadership, in turn, had no 
effect on firm success then, consequently, all characteristics such as corporate practices and 
strategic decisions would be a result of firm external factors.  
                                                          
1 Steve Denning, a prominent organizational consultant describes Drucker as “the founder of modern 
management” (Denning, 2014). 
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However, this is not the case. Indeed, corporate practices remain largely unexplained by 
external factors such as the industry and macro firm characteristics such as size (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003).  
To give an example, the capital structure, a strategic firm policy, cannot be fully explained by 
external factors such as those mentioned before. For one part it is true and easy to proof that 
companies in different industries, for instance in heaver machinery, tend to have a different 
capital structure than, for instance, companies in the recently evolving bio-tech sector.  
However, within those sectors, also outlined by Bertrand & Schoar (2003), heterogeneity still 
is very large. This leads to the assumption, which is strongly emphasized by management 
philosophers, that internal factors have a significant impact on the strategic focus of firms, with 
management playing a key role. 
General management literature describes leadership as crucial for firm success, as leaders shape 
the strategy, culture and structure of firms (Thomas, 1988). This, however, should not be 
confused with the research internal and topic related debate to which extend leadership matters 
for firm performance and which constraints it underlies. In this regard, chapter 4 analysis the 
two views, which have been forming since beginning of quantitative analysis on the leadership 
performance effect, the advocate and constraint view.  
In the field of change management, John Kotter, professor of leadership at Harvard Business 
School, made significant contributions to the topic, primarily with his bestselling work 
“Leading Change”, (Kotter, 1996). In his view, leaders are an important factor to initiate change 
in organizations, adapting them to new environments. Hence, management has the power to 
shape the strategy of organizations at various levels.  
In a narrower sense, management literature also repeatedly mentions employee commitment as 
prerequisite for sustainable firm success (Pettigrew, 1979). Commitment to an organization 
stems from a sensation of collective purpose of employees to strive for achieving the 
competitive goals of organizations. Without collective purpose as part of the culture of an 
organization, sustainable success is hard to achieve in a competitive environment.  
Hence, one of the main duties of leadership is to form this feeling of collective purpose 
(Barnard, 1938), which in turn is of the key motivators for members of organizations (Shamir, 
House, & Arthur, 1993).  
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This is where the concepts of various behavioral styles of leadership come into play. As 
described before, literature certifies leadership, or the leader (“CEO”) of a firm particular 
importance in persuading employees to execute organizational goals, also known as 
followership (Kelly, 1988).  
Charismatic leadership is one of the most influential leadership theories, which has gained in 
attention over the past decades since the 1980s (Conger, Kanungo, & Menon, 2000). 
Charismatic leadership is a leadership style, which exerts vast impact on members of an 
organization. This impact stems from the leader – follower effect, which comes from 
organizational members achieving extraordinary personal satisfaction and gratification through 
working for the cause of the leader. Certainly, much work, which has been done in the field of 
charismatic leadership, is highly theoretical and examines specific cases of high impact CEOs 
as Steve Jobs was at Apple. Those leaders are very committed to their goals and able to exert a 
high level of referent power on followers (House, 1971). Charismatic leaders, due to their 
prominent presence, have often been the starting point of the discussion whether leaders 
(“CEOs”) are a key differentiator in organizational management, that is whether they play a 
distinct role in the success of firms. 
One could argue that Steve Jobs had a high impact on Apple through its leadership style. In 
fact, Apple continued to perform excellently in terms of financial performance after his sudden 
passing. In this sense, from a general standpoint it seems unclear whether Steve Job’s period of 
leadership did matter, or if other factors resulted in Apple’s organizational environment as of 
today.  
In this regard, it is argued that leadership literature tends to overestimate the effect of leadership 
on organizational performance and neglects other important factors of influence (Bryman, 
1986). The following chapters aim answer the question whether and when leadership and the 
CEO position in particular matter for corporate performance and how to quantify this and others 







2. Outcomes and factors of interest  
 
The first question, which arises when evaluating the effect of leadership on performance, is how 
to measure performance and which factors are expected to exert influence. The most part of 
reviewed literature, which to the author’s best knowledge represents the major empirical studies 
on the subject, uses a set of individual parameters to quantify this effect. 
Measures of performance commonly include accounting ratios such as the return on assets 
(“RoA”), market indicators such as absolute stock returns over a given period or individual 
assessments of firm performance by companies’ managers. Factors, or independent variables, 
explaining those performance measures, dependent variables, are frequently, but not always 
(see section 3.1.3) classified in layers of impact, due to the mechanics of the estimation methods 
explained below. A first factor of performance could, hence, be the “time” a firm is situated in, 
followed by the industry it operates in and the specifics attributed to the company.  
 As all firms which are investigated share the property of time, events affecting all companies 
of a specific sample such as the rate of inflation are covered. This specific example of inflation 
is only valid if the sample was comprised of companies operating within a country, because 
different countries create different economic environments for firms. The factor “industry” 
would similarly account for all events companies are exposed to within their respective 
industry. An example for this are rising oil prices in the airline branch. Thirdly, the factor 
“company” covers all events specific to a single company. If now a fourth factor, “leadership”, 
is introduced another layer is added, which is specific to characteristics within a company.  
A major part of empirical research conducts analysis based on this logic, which underlies 
several assumptions and is prone to critique as further elaborated in chapter 7.  
While it has always been an intuitive guess that top managers have a key impact on 
corporations, little comprehensive studies have been undertaken to verify this assumption 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). One reason for this might be that it is indeed very complex to 
quantify effects of individual characters on whole organizations and even more so to control 






2.1. Determinants of Leadership 
 
Going even one level deeper, one could asses which characteristics of leadership are important 
within the factor of leadership. Depending on the investigated type of manager characteristic, 
specific parameters such as capital structure, employee fluctuation, etc. are typically tested for 
explanatory power for firm performance.  
In general, some authors in literature establish specific “manager styles”, which are defined as 
recurring patterns in decision making and are related to so-called manager fixed effects in 
performance (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). 
In this respect, many obstacles are to overcome. Firstly, assumption have to be made on the 
influence of managers on corporate decision. It needs to be verified whether leading managers 
indeed decide on, for instance, the capital structure of a company. Secondly, a possible manager 
effect is surely based on a vast number of specific variables, and it is difficult to capture all of 
them. Thirdly, there may be numerous independencies among the variables, for instance 
between the age of a CEO and the strategy towards R&D expenditure.  
As all those relationships described tend not to be linear, Blettner, Chaddad, & Bettis (2012) 
use aggregate literature on the topic of the CEO performance effect to establish a framework of 
interdependencies between various CEO specific and corporate variables of previous studies. 
The result is a complex network, showing the numerous interconnections between CEO 
characteristics, firm practices and outcomes.  
The dependencies among factor variables and between factor variables and dependent variables 
as well as issues of causality are difficulties, which are addressed later in this thesis.  
The next two sections present independent variables representing the identity, character or style 
of CEOs commonly used to measure firm performance. Other variables are used to identify the 
effect of leadership as a whole, the focus of this thesis, however, lies on the CEO position. 
Moreover, variables used to explain industry and company effects are not separately presented 
as this is not the focus of the thesis. 
 
2.1.1. Hard CEO Characteristics 
 




CEO identification is a number in relevant databases, which is unique to each CEO working 
for a specific firm. While including this variable in statistical models would theoretically cover 
all effects attributable to CEOs there are limitations in that many firms employ a single CEO 
during an observation period. In this case, CEO effects would be undistinguishable from firm 
effects, as there is zero variation between firm and CEO identification. This limitation is often 
overseen in empirical studies (Mackey, 2008). Hence, no effect of persistent CEOs, which also 
includes many founder CEOs, can be estimated.  
The following variables are characteristics of CEOs. Estimating the effect of those 
characteristics on firm performance gives an idea of what the overall CEO effect is comprised 
of and how specific characteristics affect firm performance.  
Age is the most obvious CEO specific attribute. In fact, some studies find that age has at least 
an effect on firm policies and strategy (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003) 
Gender is similar to age easily observable. Attempts to measure the effect of gender is 
significantly constrained by the low number of female executives (Dezsö & Ross, 2008). 
Section 6.1. deals with gender effects exclusively.  
Education is usually defined whether a CEO holds an MBA degree. Findings on MBAs are 
mixed as presented in section 6.2. Also, the type of university education can be observed, for 
instance if the CEO holds a business or technical degree (Címerová, 2012).  
Tenure describes how long a specific CEO already has served in his or her company. This can 
either be described as the total period of serving as CEO in the firm or being a member of the 
firm in general. This variable can be included to account for learning effects of the CEO 
(Mackey, 2008).  
Experience accounts for learning effects not only due to the tenure in a single firm, but in 
general over available data on a specific CEO. Experience is usually a cluster variable, which 
subsumes various characteristics such as age, tenure, education, industry tenure, etc. As a proxy 
for experience Címerová (2012) defines experience as total number of years a CEO has been 
serving as CEO over various firms and industries.  
Founder CEOs or CEOs with significant ownership stakes in the respective firms is a property 
that is often considered. Section 6.3. deals with the effect of founders on firm performance.  
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Concentration of titles measures how many functions a CEO simultaneously holds within a 
firm. This is an important measure to explain at least theoretically how independently a CEO 
can decide upon corporate actions (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005). 
 
2.1.2. Soft CEO Characteristics 
 
“Soft” characteristics refer to CEO properties, which are not directly observable. This includes 
personal behavioral patterns on a general level or in specific situations.  
Principal components are often used to group single similar characteristics into general strong 
patterns or “leadership styles”. These characteristics such as attitude towards teamwork are 
mostly unobservable and often require extensive surveys, cp. Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen 
(2007).  
That is why, according to Bertrand & Schoar (2003) some studies inclusive their own, focus on 
properties on a firm level to explain certain behaviors and performance of corporations. They 
then try to infer from relationships between observable CEO characteristics and firm policies 
such as capital structure or R&D spending, personal properties of the CEOs. 
However, due to obvious reasons this practice has limitations in examining the effect personal 
traits of CEOs and, hence, can only partly replace in-depth surveys.  
 
2.2. Performance variables  
 
Performance variables are the dependent variables in this field of research. While they are easier 
to define and to measure than the independent CEO specific variables, they should be 
interpreted with precaution. Among others, a major issue are time lags which arise due to the 
time gap between corporate actions taken and effect on accounting based variables. Time lags 
are separately addressed in chapter 7.1. 
Return on Assets (“RoA”) is the most commonly used performance variable. It is an 
accounting based variable and defined by dividing a profit figure by assets according to the 
balance sheet. The advantage of this variable is that it is easy to employ. Disadvantages are 
manifold. Firstly, only in the rarest cases the accounting return would reflect the economic 
return of a firm (Fisher & McGowan, 1983). Furthermore, accounting practices differ among 




Return on assets further fails to capture non-capitalized intangible assets, which are especially 
important nowadays. Among technological firms, this would extremely distort the explanatory 
power of RoA, as companies such as Google make significant investments in intangibles, which 
are not accounted for on the balance sheet and, hence, profit would yield a higher return on 
assets than what actual investments reflect. 
Using either net profit or EBITDA as earnings figure distorts comparability as well. While net 
profit is influenced by capital structure and asset intensity, it also might be arbitrarily 
manipulated due to strategic and tax considerations. EBITDA, on the contrary neglects 
differences in financing as emphasized by McGahan & Porter (1997).  
Despite the outlined drawbacks, most researchers continue to include RoA as at least one of 
their dependent variables for the simple reason of comparability to past research (Mackey, 
2008).  
Profit Margins are used by at least three authors in reviewed literature (Lieberson & O'Connor, 
1972), (Weiner, 1978) and (Thomas, 1988). To the thesis author’s view, profit margins are 
prone to endogeneity effects, as this variable is both a performance measure and a firm or 
industry specific characteristic, which would create reverse causality. This is in line with 
Blettner, Chaddad, & Bettis (2012), who argue that in aggerate literature dependent variables 
are sometimes used as explanatory factors and vice versa.  
Stock returns are sparsely used in literature, as this limits observable firms to public 
companies. Studies, which focus on sector or country specific research, are reluctant on smaller 
companies, which do not trade on stock exchanges. 
Tobin’ Q is repeatedly cited as superior measure of performance (McGahan, 1998), 
(Wasserman, Nohria, & Anand, 2001). Tobin’s Q is calculated by dividing the market value of 
a firm’s assets by its replacement value. For simplification, this is frequently done by dividing 
market values of equity and liabilities by the book value of equity and liabilities. A value greater 
than 1 indicates that the assets within the company are expected to generate a greater return as 
if they were incorporated outside on a standalone basis, i.e. they add value beyond their costs.  
Firm policies such as capital structure or R&D spending are indirectly related to firm 
performance. If significant effects of specific independent variables are found, it is often also 
of interest which firm policies they are associated with. This goes in the direction of determining 
specific leadership styles affecting firm performance.  
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2.3. Endogeneity in estimating the CEO performance effect 
 
However, one of the main problems studying the effects of managers on firm performance are 
issues of endogeneity. It might very well be that manager effects are correlated with firm 
characteristics. 
For instance, Bertrand & Schoar (2003) therefore build a framework in which it is possible to 
control for both observable and unobservable characteristics of firms. In order to do this, they 
track a set of individual managers over time which should allow to eliminate firm fixed effects. 
However, one point of critique to this reasoning is that they do not test whether those managers 
are always hired by the same type of firm, which would bias the result and open the door for 
endogenous effects. However, the lack of evidence of causality is acknowledged by the authors. 
Also, it is likely that general management effects are captured as well using this method, 
because when a CEO changes firm many other members of top management changes as well 
(Mackey, 2008). 
 
2.4. Prerequisites for the CEO performance effect 
 
It is suggested in literature that the effect of the CEO is dependent on the type of firm he or she 
works in as well as the industry and the economic success of the firm. Hence, CEOs with certain 
characteristics “fit” only at firms, which demand those characteristics. This leads CEOs to have 
a larger impact on firm performance in those firms, but also attracts CEOs, who expect to exert 
influence. Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, & Sadun (2016) conducted a very interesting study in this 
respect. They construct a binary model of CEO and firm types and presume that each CEO type 
fits one firm type, while one CEO type is more abundant than the other.  
Through this macro level approach Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, & Sadun (2016) are able to provide 
evidence that indeed a fit in styles between CEO and firm is necessary in the first place, for the 
CEO being able to influence firm performance.  
On a deeper level, a noteworthy contribution to the topic has been made by Wasserman, Nohria, 
& Anand (2001). The authors represent the view that it is not a question whether leadership 
matters, but in which situations it matters.  
As having said before, general management literature assesses leadership crucial performance 
for firm success, as leaders shape the strategy, culture and structure of firms (Thomas, 1988). 
Authors like Peter Drucker also emphasize the importance of opportunities for leadership. This 
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reasoning is called contingent approach, meaning that the influence of leaders or CEOs 
particularly is determined by opportunities offered by the environment such as industry, but 
also by the amount of resources a CEO has access to.  
Wasserman, Nohria, & Anand (2001) agree on that reasoning, but are able to prove that the 
larger the amount of opportunities, the smaller is CEO impact, given the firm offers enough 
resources. This is because a wide array of opportunities, in fact, makes harmful CEO decisions 
less relevant on a firm level and in relation to competitor’s decisions, given the overall amount 
of opportunities available. If, however, opportunities are scarce, each single CEO decision 
matters much more within the firm, relative to other CEO’s decisions.  
This reasoning is actually very intuitive, as the more impact seizing an opportunity has on the 
firm, the more important each individual opportunity becomes. In this framework the question 
is not, which CEO characteristics matter for either good or bad performance. If opportunities 
are scarce, CEOs generally would account for much of the firm’s performance variability 
through either seizing the right opportunities or not.  
However, this view already implies that there are differences among CEO characteristics, 
otherwise their influence on performance variability would be extremely small. Wasserman, 
Nohria, & Anand (2001) are able to prove that the higher the constraints of a particular industry, 
the higher is the impact of CEOs. Given that most opportunities firms are facing, are within an 
industry and that the impact of CEOs gains in effect when opportunities are scarce, implies that 
CEOs must differ much in their actions.  
 
3. Empirical Methodologies  
 
This chapter describes which empirical methods are most commonly used by aggregate research 
on the topic. Table 1 gives an overview of the most important studies on the CEO performance 
effect and the estimation methods used. The main question is to which part CEO characteristics 
affect firm performance. The first key variable of interest, hence, is to which share CEOs 
account for variance in performance. The second key variable is in what way specific CEO 
characteristics affect firm performance, i.e. in a positive or negative way. The former is usually 
expressed as R-squared (R²) in linear regression models, expressed as 1 minus the standard 
error of a specific variable divided by the total error of the model, as explained below.  
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3.1. Variance Component Analysis  
 
Variance component analysis (“VCA”) refers to the method of sequencing the effects of a 
general model through its individual factors. Basically, each increase in explanatory power is 
noted while adding the factors one after the other to the model. This increase is then taken as 
the relative explanatory power for the respective factor. Variance component analysis, or 
sequential variance decomposition is not to be confused with the underlying models used to 
estimate the effects, which, however, sound similar in terminology. In particular, sequential 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) refers to an estimation model accounting for each factor on a 
standalone basis, while simultaneous ANOVA accounts for interactions among these factors as 
well.  
The types of models presented in this thesis do not change the importance of the order of the 
factors when conducting a sequential variance decomposition analysis.  
For instance, Weiner & Mahoney (1981) employ a (sequential) ANOVA method to analyze the 
effects of environmental, organizational and CEO influences on corporate performance. They 
provide evidence that if the CEO variable is placed first in the ANOVA analysis, its effect can 
be increased up to 96%. From a logical standpoint of view, however, it makes sense to set 
variables in the order as outlined in Chapter 2, i.e. year, industry, firm and CEO level.  
Placing CEO variables in the first order, parts of all other levels would be attributed to it, such 
as inflation, which is a year effect (Thomas, 1988).  
 
3.1.1. Linear Regression  
 
In short, linear regression draws a best fitting line through the values of independent variables. 
The squared distance to the line (error) of each variable value is added and compared to the sum 
of squared distances to the mean of the dependent variable, yielding R² which is the variance 
explained by particular independent variables. Linear regression models are used whenever 
predicting the effect of an independent variable on firm performance is of interest or the variable 
is of continuous form. 
The size of a company would be an example of a continuous variable that could be used among 
others to estimate the effect of company effects on firm performance. Mostly, linear regression 
is used when independent variables represent regressors, which are part of an overall effect such 
as company, industry, leadership effect, and are of continuous form. Also, in former research 
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other methods were difficult to implement due to technical constraints, which limit the use of 
variables such as age as categorical variable as this results in a vast amount of factor levels such 
as in Weiner & Mahoney (1981).  
Additionally to explaining the amount of variance explained by specific independent variables, 
linear regression is also used to determine the effect of these variables. For instance, does CEO 
tenure positively or negatively affect RoA, is represented by a positive or negative coefficient 
of the regression line.  
 
3.1.2. Sequential ANOVA 
 
The bulk of empirical research uses linear analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques to 
calculate the variance explained by CEO characteristics (input factors) in a fashion as described 
in chapter 2, i.e. one factor accounted for after the other. The first researchers to use variance 
decomposition to measure CEO effects has been done already in 1972 (Lieberson & O'Connor, 
1972). 
In contrast to linear regression, which fits the independent variables on an optimal fitting line, 
ANOVA compares the means of the dependent variable for each value (level) of the 
independent variable (factor) and determines if these means are statistically different from each 
other. It is important to emphasize that both, linear regression and ANOVA rely on the same 
general linear least square model and result in the same level of R².  
However, as basic determinants of firm performance such as current year for year effects or 
CEO ID for overall CEO effects are categorical variables with vast amounts of levels, especially 
for the CEO variable, ANOVA is a more suitable method. Including those variables as dummy 
variables in a linear regression model would result in a confusing output table with each level 
of a factor listed separately. Also, the aggregate explanatory power of the factors is usually of 
interest instead of the slope i.e. the relative impact of each level. 
It is further important to keep in mind that in all models, factor levels without variation, i.e. a 
company which is the only one representing a whole industry or a CEO who works for the same 
firm over the whole observation period will be omitted due to collinearity. This is logical as 





3.1.3. Simultaneous ANOVA 
 
A major point of criticism by some researchers is that sequential ANOVA estimation assumes 
zero covariance between factors (McGahan & Porter, 1997) (Fitza, 2014) (Mackey, 2008). 
However, in reality, reasonable covariance between factors such as company and CEO factors 
can be measured (McGahan & Porter, 1997). As a result, this covariance would be attributed to 
the former factor inserted in the sequential variance decomposition analysis, in this case CEO 
effects would be falsely attributed to company effects. This is why, the authors mentioned above 
usually extend the classical one-way ANOVA estimation with a model that accounts for 
covariance between factors.  
It could be argued further that the issues of sequential ANOVA potentially decrease the CEO 
effect, but never increase, when placed at last order. Hence, findings of a significant CEO effect 
on performance through sequential ANOVA might be challenged in that they underestimate 
CEO effect, but not in that the effect is overestimated or does not exist.  
 
3.1.4. Fixed versus random effects  
 
Usually, analysis in variance decomposition assumes dependent variables to be driven by fixed 
effects. This means that there are no recurring patterns or chance factors influencing firm 
performance, which is expected only to be driven by fixed year, industry, company and 
leadership effects. Some authors, however, point out that exactly this is not the case. Fitza 
(2014) argues that by using variance decomposition techniques, a major part of explanatory 
power of the CEO effect is caused by random effects. The reason why CEO effects are 
especially prone to random effects as compared to industry and company effects lies in the low 
number of CEO changes within a firm year matched panel data set.  
Year, industry, and firm effects, represent exponentially growing subsamples exactly in this 
order. This vastly reduces the possibility of random effects being attributed to those factors. For 
the CEO level, however, the number of CEOs does not increase relative to the number 
companies. This is because firms show relatively few CEO changes within a reasonable 
timespan. Hence, a change in firm performance of two periods represented by two distinct 
CEOs, would fully be attributed to the CEO effect after controlling for the other levels, although 
this may also include some random effects. To quantify these random effects, Fitza (2014) 
constructs a sample with random performance variables to measure the CEO effect. It shows, 
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that about two thirds of the overall measured CEO fixed effect is attributable to random events. 
This important model also serves as a robustness check in the empirical part of this thesis.  
 
3.1.5. Non-linear systems 
 
Going one step further Blettner, Chaddad, & Bettis (2012) advocate a view of “complex 
independencies” in respect to the CEO effect on firm performance. Instead of assuming fixed 
and sequential levels of impact, they establish a network of interrelated environmental, 
company and CEO specific variables. These dependencies are expected to variate over time, 
i.e. in a non-linear way. Such a methodology, commonly practiced in hard sciences, would 
present the CEO effect on firm performance in a “fit” perspective, according to Blettner, 
Chaddad, & Bettis (2012). Social sciences, in general, still lack in such empirical studies and 
are subject to further research.  
 
3.2. Micro versus Macro CEO Characteristics  
 
As outlined in section 2.1.1. aggregate research focuses on directly observable (macro) CEO 
characteristics and indirectly observable (micro) CEO characteristics. The latter revers to 
individual leadership styles.  
Prior to Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007), only few researchers have investigated the CEO 
effect through examining individual leadership styles rather than clearly observable 
characteristics such as age or tenure in a specific company. In order to gather these data, they 
collect survey data from each specific CEO and the owner of the firm a CEO serves in. Such 
surveys, in the case of Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007) 40 pages long, of course impose 
restrictions. They can only be done for a limited number of managers and companies and within 
a limited time span, as they are usually very costly.  
Bertrand & Schoar (2003) is another well cited example in this regard. As describes before, 
they define manager style as an array of accounting and organizational variables, while 
managers refer to the CEO position as well as to other top-level executives such as CFOs and 
COOs. Bertrand & Schoar (2003) then aim to find how much specific managers impact those 
variables, i.e. how large the manager fixed effects are. However, in contrast to Kaplan, 
Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007), they do not define which personal characteristics could be the 
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underlying cause for these corporate practices, but rather assess managers general 
characteristics such as aggressiveness for higher debt levels.  
On the other hand, the study of Bertrand & Schoar (2003) is unique as it controls for firm fixed 
effects in a novel fashion. This is achieved through a panel data set they employ to track 
individual managers over time and firms and therefore enables them to better separate firm and 
manager fixed effects.  
A point of criticism on conducting research on the effect of unobservable manager 
characteristics is that those are, as mentioned before, extremely hard to gather and also show a 
great level of noise within the data. Instead, some authors recommend to use observable 
characteristics as proxy for unobservable ones in line with Bertrand & Schoar (2003) and 
Hambrick & Mason (1984). 
 
4. Should CEOs really matter? 
 
This chapter outlines two distinct views on the performance effect of leadership, which are 
frequently referred to in existing literature. Advocates support the theory that leadership and 
especially the CEO have a significant impact for firm performance, opponents either oppose 
this view or refer to substantial constraints, which the leadership effect underlies.  
  
4.1. Advocates of the Leadership Effect 
 
According to management theory as presented in chapter 1, it is often argued that leadership in 
general plays a great role in firm success. Under the so-called leadership school, topic specific 
researchers are of the opinion that leadership and the choices managers make are crucial for 
firm success. Naturally, in management literature most authors support this view. 
Child (1972), for instance, argues that CEOs influence firm performance by making distinct 
choices in order to change the organization to fit the environment. Moreover, CEOs even 
manipulate their environment to create opportunities for the firm.  
In a similar way, according Rotemberg & Saloner (2000), CEOs make choices and implement 
strategies due to idiosyncratic believes of the likely evolution of the industry. This means that 
the opinions of CEOs regarding industry opportunities are different from those of other insider 
managers as well as from firm outsiders, and therefore, CEOs personally create variation in 
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firm performance. As firm owners or the board of directors appoint CEOs, Rotemberg & 
Saloner argue that CEOs become idiosyncratic or biased in favor to follow his or her own 
ambitions, after being appointed as CEO. Those idiosyncratic goals are different from other 
members of the organization and should therefore increase performance variability as well 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
As a result, it should also not be surprising that outside CEOs have a greater impact on 
organizational changes than CEOs hired internally (Wiersema, 1992) or when a CEO is hired 
after a disruptive period (Khurana & Nohria, 1999). In the first case, outsider CEOs are 
expected to be less aligned to established organizational practices and in the second case, a 
company is expected to appoint a CEO, who acts radically different than its predecessor, as 
previous CEO behavior is not connected with firm success.  
 
4.2. Opponents of the Leadership Effect 
 
These findings stand in clear contrast to the neoclassical view in which individual managers 
play an insignificant role in organizations and can easily be substituted.  
Very recently in 2014, Prof. Fitza from A&M University, Texas, USA, has postulated that the 
effect of CEOs on firm performance is to a major part attributable to pure chance as firm 
performance follows stochastic patterns, and accounting for these would result in a much 
smaller CEO effect. His conclusions challenge a major part of past literature on the topic and 
are presented in chapter 7 (Fitza, 2014). 
This is in line with other authors who see leadership itself less important for firm success. A 
prominent example would be Hannan & Freeman (1989), who elaborate on the limited role of 
leadership due to various constraints due to internal and external forces. These are based on 
environmental, legitimacy or organizational factors and are called “the inertia” of CEOs. 
Others further argue that in the end, CEOs mainly serve a representative purpose Pfeffer (1977). 
As contrast to this general reasoning is the research of Jay Conger, one of the premier 
researchers on charismatic leadership as mentioned in chapter 1. He attempts to directly 
measure the effect of CEO characteristics on other organizational members in several studies 
(Conger & Kanungo, 1998) and (Conger, Kanungo, & Menon, 2000). While they do confirm 
for instance that charismatic leadership has a strong influence on organization members and 
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that this influence increases when the leader (CEO) recognizes environmental opportunities, no 
direct effects on firm performance are reported.  
A more differentiated view is that CEOs might initially after appointment have power to exert 
influence, but later loose that power due to the stiffening of relationships over time within the 
organization, which again causes inertia (Burkhardt, 1991). Other more general management 
and organizational culture researchers such as Martin (1992) assert organizations deep levels 
of sub- and counter cultures. This especially applies to large companies and greatly limits the 
influence a CEO can have on firm output. 
One of the main proponents of a constrained view on CEO influence is Jeffrey Pfeffer, who is 
a prominent professor of organizational theory at the Stanford University, USA since 1979. 
Together with Gerald Salancik, they advocate the theory of resource dependency (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  
In general, resource dependency implies that a company’s success and freedom to take action 
depends on outside resource availability. For instance, if production inputs are available in a 
very fragmented market with many competing suppliers, resource dependency in that regard 
would be low, as compared to a monopoly of a supplier. The second question is, to which degree 
the company can control a limited resource. Even if there was only one single supplier for a 
company’s input, dependency would be low, if that company was the only customer of its 
supplier. 
In turn, those resource or more general, environmental constraints affect the number of choices 
leading managers such as CEOs face. A CEO appointment is, according to Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978), more a product of environmental opportunities and constraints. The CEO, however, 
does not exert much active influence on the firm (Pfeffer, 1977).  
Company leadership tends to accredit itself with firm success, however, in turn, it often is 
exchanged due to bad performance even it stems from outside factors. Organizational power 
stems more from the interplay of different divisions within an organization.  
As environmental developments and divisions within organizations define the hiring and 
exchange of leadership, CEOs should be very homogenous in their characteristics (Pfeffer, 
1977). This would imply that CEO effects on firm performance would not be measurable, which 




5. Existing Literature Findings 
 
The present master’s thesis covers empirical findings from the foundational work of Lieberson 
& O'Connor in 1972 to resent findings. Table 1 gives an overview of those studies, their main 
results and implications. 
 
5.1. Empirical results  
 
One of the first and probably most influential study was conducted by Lieberson & O'Connor 
(1972). The data used was collected from the years 1946 to 1965 on 167 major public 
companies. For many subsequent studies, the research of Lieberson & O'Connor (1972) serves 
as reference literature and represents a base case and benchmark for further investigation. The 
researchers find that the CEO position accounts for as much as 14.5% of variance in 
performance. However, there are several differences to more recent studies. Firstly, Lieberson 
& O'Connor (1972) use the variance of profit margins as dependent variable, instead the 
recently more commonly used variance of return on assets. Both variables have their drawbacks 
as described in section 2.1.1 and may lack in comparability.  
Lieberson & O'Connor (1972) find similar to other researchers an increase of CEO effects when 
accounting for time lagged effects, with the CEO effect increasing to 32% of explained variance 
in profit margins. 
The work of Lieberson & O'Connor (1972) has also been subject to substantial criticism. 
Specifically, Weiner (1978) argues that sequential variance decomposition analysis is not 
suitable to measure the CEO effect, as this effect can be greatly increased by reversing the order 
of entry. However, Thomas (1988) points out that this reasoning is not a valid counterargument. 
Surely, measuring CEO effects on performance before accounting for year, industry, and 
company effects would cause many factors such as inflation, which is a factor included in year 
effects, to be party attributed to the CEO. Thomas (1988) concludes that sequential variance 
decomposition proves an effective analysis, which is dependent on the correct order of factor 
estimation.  
In a very interesting way, Thomas (1988) is able to show that companies, even within the same 
industry, show great heterogeneity. Is this achieved by his sample construction, which narrows 
the sample to an as homogeneous company group as possible. These are a small sample of UK 
retail firms that coexisted over the whole sample period. Year effects remain as usual small and 
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industry effects are due to sample selection not present. Company effects, however, explain 





Table 1. Major studies on the CEO effect on firm performance      




Linear regression 167 companies in 13 
industries (1946-1965) 
Effect of CEO: 14.5%, 
with time lagged 
performance measure 
31.7%. 
Reference work for most 
subsequent studies.  
Questionable performance variables, 
exclusion of many companies with M&A 
activity, nesting effects possible, effect on 
margins than on sales or profits (Aldrich 
1979), flawed due to sequential analysis 
according to (Hambrick & Mason 1984). 
Weiner (1978) VCA* 193 manufacturing firms 
(randomly selected) (1956-
1974) 
Fixed-effect of CEO: 
8.7%.  
Reversed order of entry with CEO 
first: CEO explains 77.5%-96.1%. 
Author criticizes 
Lieberson&O'Conner's work as 
the results are only artifacts of 
entry order. 
Replication of Lieberson & O'Conner. 











12.8% of variance of 
profit, 43.9% of 
profitability, 47% of stock 
price. 
Multiple regression should 
overcome sequential VCA issues. 
According to Thomas 1988 
support Lieberson and O'Conner 
results. 
Limitations in comparability due to different 
approach and use of stock returns. 
Thomas 
(1988) 
VCA* 12 UK retail firms (1965-
1984) 
Fixed-effect of Leadership: 
5.7% with total R² of 
94.6%. 
Supports Lieberson & O'Conner 
and disproves Weiner’s (1978) 
and Aldrich’s (1979) critique.  
Sample small and very biased, which is on 










US firms 4-digit Sic code, 
72742 observations for 5196 
business segments (1981-
1994) 
Only industry and firm 
specific. 
Serves as basis for Wasserman, 
Nohria and Anand (2001). They 
argue that sequential ANOVA 
does not account for covariance 
and attributes it to the first factor 
entered due to nesting and 
imprecision. 
Random effect assumption of factors is 
questionable. E.g. industry might not be 
randomly attributed to firms.  
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531 companies in 42 
industries 
Effect of CEO: 14.7% 
(RoA) and 13.5% (Tobin’s 
Q).  
They claim RoA measure is 
flawed. Large differences are 
found within industries (in contrast 
to Thomas 1988). CEO effect is 
biggest when resource availability 
is high and opportunities scarce. 
No causality between CEO effect and 





600 firms, 500 managers 
matched panel data set 1969-
1999 (Top 800 Forbes firms) 
1992-1999 (S&P 1500 firms 
CEOs with best effects on 
RoA (top 25%) increase 
RoA by 3%. 
They argue that Wasserman, 
Nohria and Anand 2001 do not 
control for firm fixed effects, but 
indeed they do.  
No causality between managers, firm 







336 firms 1992-1999 When CEO is the founder, 
standard deviation stock 
returns increase by 22%. 
Firm performance more variable 
the more decision power a CEO 
has. Use future and past time 






Linear regression  313 CEO candidates for PE 
portfolio companies (VC and 
LBO) (2000-2006) 
Hard skills are most 
correlated with success. 
They go beyond observable 
characteristics and group 40 









100 US, 100 German, 100 




CEO effect is 4.6% (Japan) 
and 13.4% (US). 
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520 firms (51 firms with 
strongest limitations) (1992-
2002) 
Without constraints and 
sequential ANOVA: CEO: 
12.9%, With constraints 
and simultaneous 
ANOVA: CEO 29.21%, 
Fewer constraints and 
simultaneous ANOVA: 
CEO: 23.8%. 
 CEO effect is systemically 
underestimated due to nesting in 
industry and firm effect and use of 
sequential ANOVA method. 
Artificial selection of CEOs who served in 
multiple firms within sample. 
Deszö and 
Ross (2008) 
Linear regression S&P 1500 firms, 19,509 firm 
year observations (1992-
2006) 
Firms with at least one 
female executive have 3% 
increased Tobin's Q. 
Female effect is only driven by 
firms which have R&D expense. 
Females in CEO position is neutral 




Linear regression 1,930 U.S. firms, 2,426 
CEOs with at least 3-year 
tenure (1996-2006) 
Experience matters more 
for firm performance than 
education, MBA CEOs 
smooth returns.  
Powerful CEOs should be 
constrained to stabilize firm. 
Founder CEOs cause largest 
performance variability.  
Selection bias might arise due to taking into 
account only experienced CEOs (3-year firm 
tenure). 
Fitza (2014) Simultaneous 
ANOVA 
1,425 U.S. firms, 2,634 
CEOS (1993-2012) 
Base case reports CEO 
effect of 17.7%.  
Using a random performance 
variable, Fitza reduces real CEO 








1,015 U.S. firms, 2,732 
CEOs (1950-2009) 
CEO effect increased from 
7.8% (1950s-1960s) to 
15.7% (1990s-2000s). 
Increasing CEO effect is due to 
increased demand of shareholder 
value maximization, more 
complex markets and wide options 






Linear regression 1,114 surveyed CEOs in 
Brazil, France, Germany, 
India, UK and US  
Evidence of a matching 
frictions between firms and 
CEOs through binary 
characteristic model.  
Authors employ novel machine 
learning algorithm to classify 
CEOs. 
Matching frictions could be due to the fact 
that firms relying on scarce CEO type are 
forced to hire the inefficient abundant CEO 
type, if this is the only available CEO type. 




At first sight, this sample would be expected to cause large selection bias. Interestingly, 
however, it shows that companies even as similar as possible differ a lot. Secondly, the control 
levels year, industry, company and CEO are indeed able to explain most of performance 
variance (96% in the sample), supporting underlying theory. It could be argued that the reported 
CEO effect of 5.7% is underestimated, or conversely, overestimated by other studies. It shows, 
however, that when accounting for random effects as done by Fitza (2014) and in the empirical 
part in section 8.5.2, the fixed CEO effect shrinks to a range between 4% to 6% independent of 
sample selection, i.e. the relative difference between fixed and random CEO effects remains 
constant.  
It can be further argued that the high company effects found by Thomas (1988) are due to 
random effects. Then, however, the CEO effect measured by Thomas (1988) should be much 
larger as explained in section 3.1.4, which is not the case. Hence, it can be concluded that 
Thomas (1988) work supports Lieberson & O'Connor’s (1972) work, the underlying theory and 
the findings that, in realty, only about 5% of performance variance can be explained be the CEO 
as true fixed effects.  
As cited before, one very foundational work has been done by Bertrand and Schoar in 2003. In 
their work, they track individual top-managers such as CEOs, CFOs and COOs over time in a 
panel data set and examine each manager’s fixed effects on corporate behavior and firm 
performance. Bertrand and Schoar conclude that manager fixed effects matter for corporate 
decisions.  
Manager effects have the biggest impact on acquisitions, diversification, dividend payout 
policies, interest coverage and cost cutting measures. Also, by correlating manager fixed effects 
with firm policies, it becomes evident that differences in “managing styles” are very 
pronounced. For instance, managers who engage more in acquisitions invest less in capex and 
R&D. Furthermore, only considering the distribution of managers in relation to their effect on 
return on assets, it shows that managers of in the 75th percentile increase RoA by 3% and 
managers in the 25th decrease RoA by the same amount.  
In a final step, Bertrand and Schoa (2003) confirm general intuitions concerning hard attributes 
of managers. This is, for instance, that older CEOs are more conservative in their investment 
behavior, while MBA CEOs tend to be more aggressive. In summary, Bertrand and Schoa 




Through examining the largest 1,500 US based firms (S&P 1500), Fitza (2014) finds that CEO 
tenure is too short to rule out luck factors affecting performance of a company. Unforeseen 
events such as a major scandal at a competitor can increase the performance of a specific firm. 
In the same way, other chance events would lower that firm’s performance. On average, those 
events are being canceled out by the passing of time.  
However, according to Fitza (2014) average CEO tenure is too short for this “regression to the 
mean” to have sufficient time to apply. With Average CEO tenure being only four years, chance 
has a big impact on performance during this timeframe. Prof. Fitza concludes that over 70% of 
a CEOs contribution to firm performance could the attributable to sheer randomness. These 
findings strongly support the theoretical conclusions of Blettner, Chaddad, & Bettis (2012) that 
firm performance follows a stochastic proccess of a frequency, which is longer than average 
CEO tenure. It is argued by Fitza (2014) that it is often difficult to distinguish between patterns 
in data such as strochastic processes and sheer random behavior. Either way, the outcome would 
be similar, namely that effects of random or stochastic nature, outside the scope of the controlled 
factors, are attributed to the CEO position.  
While one valid conclusion of this work is that CEOs should not the rewarded based on a single 
year’s performance, the study has limitations. By controlling for factors such as chance events 
or the short CEO tenures, present literature review provides evidence for substantial effects of 
CEOs on firm performance. The model employed by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), for instance, 
in which they track individual managers effect on firm performance over time and firms, is 
specifically designed to rule out exogenic effects such as chance events.  
 
Mackey (2008) reports that CEOs account for about 30% of the variance in firm performance, 
whereas industry and corporate effects are much smaller. He investigates CEO effects also on 
a segment level and finds, similar to O’Reilly, Caldwell, & Chatman (2005) that the CEO effect 
is strongest at corporate level. However, one could argue that Mackey’s sample restrictions 
cause selection bias by only accounting for CEOs who served in more than one firm and firms 
having employed more than one CEO. This could artificially select CEOs, which indeed are 
more influential than the average CEO and firms in which the CEO is especially important and 
in line with Hannan & Freeman (1989) has the ability to exert influence. So, the question that 
remains is, whether Mackey (2008) is right in arguing that most existing literature systemically 
underestimates the CEO effect, or Mackey systemically overestimates its effect.  
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However, Mackey (2008) argues that most empirical research underestimates the CEO effect 
on firm performance, though not employing the restrictions described before. Fitza (2014), 
criticizes Mackey’s (2008) argumentation, that only CEOs should be regarded, who serve in 
multiple firms within the sample. This restriction is not necessary for variance decomposition. 
Similarly, individual companies also belong to a single industry. Following Mackey’s (2008) 
reasoning it would, therefore, also be necessary to find companies changing industries to 
correctly estimate company effects; this, however, is probably not necessary and would cause 
strong selection bias. 
Another important contribution to the topic has been done by Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen 
(2007). In their paper, the authors aim to answer the question whether CEO characteristics 
predict firm performance in buyout and venture capital (“VC”) firms. Also questions regarding 
which characteristics matter most in these two different types of companies are answered. 
Additionally, an important distinction is whether inside or outside knowledge is recruited by 
firm owners.  
To investigate this question, Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007) take into account over 40 
personal CEO characteristics in seven general areas. Special about their work is, that it is one 
of the few studies, which conducts an in-depth assessment of the CEOs. While most research 
relies on general statistical data available for large US companies, Kaplan, Klebanov, & 
Sorensen (2007) rely on personal CEO assessments through detailed questionnaires. However, 
the sample of CEOs is restricted to buyout and VC firms, which might cause a lack of 
comparability to papers which investigate large public companies.  
Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007) find that inside CEOs are less strictly assessed by buyout 
firms than outside CEOs. This means that there is a tradeoff between the “general” outsider 
knowledge and inside knowledge, while inside knowledge is stronger weighted. However, this 
might be logical for, compared to S&P 1500 firms, smaller companies which also operate in 
specialized fields, as common in private equity. Hence, an outside CEO would have to offer a 
higher than equal level of general skills and experience than an inside CEO to compensate for 
this special situation of buyout targets. For VC firms, this might apply even more.  
However, Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007) emphasize that controlling for general 
knowledge, inside CEOs are not more successful than outsiders. Therefore, they conclude that 
knowledge specific to a firm is overvalued by strategic investors.  
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Concerning performance, Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007) not surprisingly find that CEO 
characteristics matter for performance. This is expected as other authors such as Lieberson & 
O'Connor, (1972) and later research on this basis, already find relatively large CEO effects for 
public companies. Therefore, it could be expected that CEOs exert a greater influence in a 
buyout environment, where CEO power is much higher. As Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira (2005) 
already state, the ability for a CEO to theoretically have influence on firm decisions is a 
prerequisite for CEO characteristics to impact firm performance in the end.  
 
A unique method of investigating the effect of CEOs on firm performance is established by 
Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, & Sadun (2016). Similar to Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007) they 
individually assess CEOs through a survey over the course of one week.  
Special about this study is that not only US based firms are investigated, but also firms based 
in Brazil, France, Germany, India and the UK. This allows to identify variable effects of the 
CEO impact relative to, for instance, country wealth. Indeed, for less developed countries a 
lager effect of CEO impact is detected.  
In detail, Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, & Sadun (2016) match the collected CEO observations with 
only two distinct types of behavior, the abundant “micromanager”, who pursues a more direct 
leadership style and the scarce “coordinator”, who is eager to include a larger number of 
managers and employees in the decision-making process.  
Their assumption is that all firms investigated achieve an optimal “CEO fit” with either 
behavioral type one or two. As said, it is further assumed that one of the two types is abundant, 
the “micromanager”, whereas the other type is scarce, the “coordinator”. This leads to CEOs of 
the abundant type trying to be appointed as CEO in firms, which demand the scarce type. Due 
to matching frictions such as the inability of firms to correctly identify the optimal CEO type, 
some companies are led by inefficient CEOs. Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, & Sadun (2016) hence 
hypothesize that if the correlation of CEO behavior and performance is not zero there must be 
an effect of different CEO characteristics on firm performance.  
This effect is positive and highly significant. Also, correlation on the scarce behavioral type is 
not generally positive with firm performance, which otherwise would imply that only this 
behavior increases firm performance.  
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An important conclusion of this paper is that it is the inefficiency of firms appointing optimal 
CEOs which leads on an impact of the CEO on firm performance and not the CEO’s individual 
characteristics, which consequently cannot predict firm performance (Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, 
& Sadun, 2016) 
A point of criticism, which the authors however acknowledge, is that the simplicity of the 
method setup does not allow to investigate more detailed CEO characteristics, the general 
difference between a coordinative and micromanager leadership style.  
Also, the authors implicitly assume that in contrast to firms, CEOs are perfectly able to 
determine whether a firm would be a good fit to their abilities. However, this assumption might 
actually be the case as CEO candidates have much more information on, especially public, firms 
than vice versa.  
Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, & Sadun (2016) also successfully test if the results hold for time lagged 
measures of performance, to reject criticism that the detected binary impact of CEOs merely is 
a result of other unobservable firm effects.  
Table 4 gives an overview of selected CEO effects on firm performance, which are comparable 
regarding the underlying empirical methods. In summary, prevalent findings reviewed in this 
chapter provide significant evidence for a strong CEO effect on firm performance.  
 
6. Leader specific effects 
 
The following chapter examines specific attributes of CEOs, which play an important role in 
the effect on firm performance. 
The experience and education of CEOs certainly are one of the most regarded variables when 
estimating CEO effects on firm performance. Firstly, it can be intuitively assumed that these 
factors play a significant role of overall CEO influence and secondly, they are relatively easy 
to obtain from various databases.  
Címerová (2012) investigates those two CEO characteristics while adding the level of power 
individual CEOs maintain within an organization. Címerová measures power by determining 
four measures. These are whether specific CEOs are the founders of the company and the only 
insider on the board. Also, their concentration of titles and managerial discretion is measured. 
The number of insider board members is a crucial variable in determining CEO power, as a 
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larger board implies greater internal constraints, especially when comprised of firm outsiders 
(Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005).  
The rationale behind this method is the theory that CEO characteristics should matter more if, 
in the first place, a CEO shows a level of power, which is sufficient to have an impact on 
corporate practices. This is also based on Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira (2005), who find that an 
increase in CEO power results in an increase of firm performance variability.  
As a result, Címerová (2012) finds that, not surprisingly, the CEO being the founder of the 
company causes the largest level of power and matters most for corporate performance in 
conjunction with a higher level of experience. This finding is confirmed by Adams, Almeida, 
& Ferreira (2005), reporting a by 22% increased standard deviation of stock returns when a 
given CEO is also the founder of the firm.  
In line with above reasoning Címerová (2012) further finds that CEOs with a technical 
background cause higher firm performance variability as well. This makes sense, as the 
personal connection of those CEOs to the success of the companies’ output such as products 
should, similar to founder CEOs, be higher, which therefore may lead to greater risk-taking. 
Especially the lack of education in corporate finance could lead technical experienced CEOs to 
riskier corporate leadership styles, supported by the MBA effect described in section 6.2. 
 
6.1. The Female Effect 
 
Dezsö & Ross (2008) find that soft skills, which usually are attributed to a stronger extend to 
female CEOs, positively affect firm performance. This is according to the authors especially 
the case in innovation intensive companies, as collaboration and facilitation of team work is 
crucial in an R&D environment.  
A very interesting question is, whether women as managers affect firm performance in a special 
way. It is common knowledge that female managers are underrepresented in corporate 
leadership positions. This is especially the case for the CEO position. According to 
COMPUSTAT data of the empirical part, among S&P 1500 firms, only 6.25% of all top-
executives such as CEOs, CFOs and COOs have been female in 2016. However, of these only 
65 have been registered as CEOs, which corresponds to 4.4% of all S&P 1500 CEOs in 2016.  
This number is certainly very low. On the other side, it is slightly increasing year by year and 
also strongly depends on industry.  
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It might be that the CEO position represents a special public role, which is even more the case 
for large enterprises such as found in the S&P 1500. Indeed, there is evidence that the sole 
announcement of a female CEO negatively affects stock prices (Lee & James, 2007), which 
might also reflect a sociocultural response, additional to the fact that female CEOs seem to 
indeed lower firm performance in some circumstances as elaborated on below.  
In their paper, Dezsö & Ross (2008) postulate that a female leadership style increases 
competitiveness through female’s stronger teamwork orientation, especially in innovation 
intensive firms. In this in line with Finkelstein & Hambrick (1996), who also see in female 
management participation a distinct source of competitive advantage.  
The main finding in the research paper of Dezsö & Ross (2008) is that female executives add 
value if positioned below the CEO, but do not affect or even decrease performance when 
appointed as CEOs. 
The rationale behind this finding is that the female leadership style, which has similar attributes 
to the soft managerial skills established by Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen (2007), makes 
management more efficient. Women foster stronger relationships and collaborate more intense, 
which boosts creativity. This, in turn, facilitates intrinsic motivation. As a result, female 
participation should matter the most in companies in which teamwork is most essential, i.e. 
innovation intensive firms (Ginsberg, 1994). 
Dezsö & Ross (2008) indeed find that female management has the greatest impact in companies 
with high R&D expenditure, strictly speaking this seems to be a prerequisite for a female impact 
on firm performance.  
However, on the CEO level females lack on average in aggressiveness and the necessary hard 
skills (Oakley, 2000). Also, as a matter of fact, the CEO is positioned on a single player level, 
where collaboration on an equal eye to eye level with other managers is limited. Hence, the 
relative advantage of female management styles diminishes on the CEO level.  
Dezsö & Ross (2008) use various accounting measures as indicator of firm performance such 
as Tobins’s Q. Their findings are confirmed by other authors, who find similar results on return 
on investments (RoI), (Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997) and gross margins (Smith, Smith, & 
Verner, 2006). When investigating effects on the stock market, Welbourne (1999) finds a 




Another more intuitive view of the increasing performance effect of female participation is that 
females, as a response to sociocultural performance, need to outperform male peers in personal 
and educational skills in order to be offered equal professional opportunities (Eagly & 
Johannesen-Schmidt, 2007). However, as a result female participation should positively affect 
all types of firms instead of innovation intensive firms only. Also, Dezsö & Ross (2008) note 
that female CEOs then should increase performance as well.  
It might very well be, however, that on average, the relative lack in hard skills of female CEOs 
more than offsets their higher general skills versus male CEOs. Another meaningful hypothesis 
would be that on the CEO level, the disparity of educational skills and experience between male 
and female managers is much lower than on corporate levels below the CEO.  
In summary, the effect of the better educational background of female managers is hard to 
quantify, also due to the many independencies and reverse causalities between managers and 
corporate organizations.  
Some authors also suggest opposite views of female management participation. In some 
situations, the variety of decisions and opinions, which is increased through females may 
represent a source of internal conflicts in organizations (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
More research has to be conducted in assessing the unique value proposition of a higher 
presence of female managers in top level positions affecting firm performance. As a matter of 
fact, given the very low number of actual female leaders, this research question is difficult to 
investigate and results may be biased. Given that the percentage share of female managers 
continues to increase, more comprehensive research could be conducted in the future. However, 
when comparing future to past results, it is important to keep in mind that corporate culture 
might has changed as well. This means, for instance, that the way male managers within the 
organization or shareholders react to female participation today may be different in the future.  
 
6.2. The MBA Effect 
 
Representing a very important personal CEO variable used in many studies, there are different 
views on the relevance of an MBA title. Pfeffer (1981), for instance, states that the MBA title 
itself does not affect performance variability at all, but rather acts as a necessary prerequisite 
for candidates to be considered as CEOs. Empirical research, however, shows mixed results.  
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Címerová (2012) reports that MBA holders tend to smooth firm performance variability as 
those CEOs have a stronger strategic focus on firm stability. This finding is in line with 
Hambrick & Mason (1984), who argue that MBA degree holders exert a more moderate 
leadership style. This roots in the assumption that CEOs with MBA degrees are less risk-taking 
than, for instance, founders, as stated before. MBAs may be personally less connected to their 
companies than founders and may be appointed just because of their predictable managements 
skills. Graham & Harvey (2001), confirm for the CFO level that MBA degree holders use, 
regarding corporate finance skills, superior academic methods than CFOs without MBA degree. 
It can be assumed that this applies at the CEO level as well.  
On the other hand, MBAs sacrifice innovations and a long-term strategy for achieving short-
term goals instead (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This is also coherent with the reasoning outlined 
before, namely that MBAs are more distant to corporate identity than founders or long-term 
insiders.  
Contrary to those findings, Bertrand & Schoar (2003) find in their panel data set that CEOs 
with MBA degree foster more aggressive decisions than the average CEO. Although they are 
in line with Pfeffer (1981) in that MBA degree holders influence firms through having a starting 
advantage to be appointed, Bertrand & Schoar (2003) find that those CEOs show higher 
CAPEX spending and higher debt holdings than the average CEO. Moreover, there is consensus 
with Címerová (2012) with MBAs investing less in R&D activities and generally, MBAs follow 
a decision-making process which is more based on management education.  
The differences in among diverse views on the MBA effect might be rooted in the definition of 
“aggressiveness”. Bertrand & Schoar (2003) define aggressiveness as how CEOs approach 
capital structure. However, they find that CEOs with MBA degrees also pay less dividends than 
the average CEO, which reflects a more conservative approach. Hence, differences in corporate 
finance decisions may originate from better corporate finance skills of MBAs in establishing 
an optimal capital, rather than from an “aggressive” approach in respect to the leadership style.  
While there is superficial dissent about the leadership style of MBA degree holders, it is 
repeatedly confirmed that MBAs invest less in innovation, tend to make decisions in accordance 
with management literature and are more short-term oriented (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003) 




6.3. The effect of firm types 
 
Even to a greater extend than previous research finds on a mixed set of companies, hard 
leadership skills seem to matter for private equity portfolio companies. In fact, hard skills such 
as deciding over laying off employees, who do not meet the CEO’s standards or measures to 
increase work efficiency, positively affect firm performance. In turn, soft skills such as pursuing 
collaboration and teamwork actually negatively affect firm performance (Kaplan, Klebanov, & 
Sorensen, 2007). This is strongly in line with Dezsö & Ross (2008), who find that similar soft 
skills contribute to firm performance below CEO level, but harm firm performance at the CEO 
level, as described in section 6.1. 
As buyout companies usually show unique capabilities in research and development, which 
makes them attractive as takeover targets, this “female participation effect” and thereof 
deducted leadership style, should be even more significant in companies owned by private 
equity firms.  
On the other side, it is not surprising that on the CEO level hard skills are crucial for buyout 
firms. Firstly, as stated before, CEO power is very high in buyout firms. This means that as the 
company is entirely taken over by a strategic investor, the newly appointed CEO usually should 
have full support of the owners and the also of newly appointed remaining top management. 
Additionally, target company size is usually small to mid-size, further increasing CEO power. 
This is because, the higher the number of managers the CEO has to interact with and the more 
complex the organizational structure, the less influence the CEO has (Adams, Almeida, & 
Ferreira, 2005). 
It might also very well be that private equity firms preferably acquire companies, where 
performance increases are achievable through common “hard skills” measures. As a matter of 
fact, buyout firms are usually either rationalized through, for instance, employee cuts or 
optimized through more efficient processes, in order to achieve an instant increase in cash flow 
and hence valuation.  
In interesting question would be, whether soft skills or female participation in particular below 





7. Selected methodical critique  
 
Blettner, Chaddad, and Bettis (2012) challenge the most conclusions of past research in this 
field. Although many studies identify the CEO position in general and various other 
subordinated variables such as CEO experience to be significant performance fixed effects, 
three key aspects are not kept in mind. These are the stochastic nature of time series as 
previously mentioned, confounding of CEO, firm and time and interaction effects among 
sources of the CEO performance effect.  
Concerning the first point, Blettner, Chaddad, and Bettis (2012) argue that since firm 
performance indicators such as return on assets follow a mean reverting process (Denrell, 
2005), fixed effects models are biased as they are unable to measure the effect of stochastic 
processes. Mean reversion is a process in which a specific variable has an equilibrium value, 
not necessarily zero, to which the process tends to return over time. According to existing 
literature this is the case for most performance variables. This is easily observable for stock 
returns through the movement of stock prices to previous levels after major shocks or booms. 
On the other hand, Fitza (2014) states that pure random effects often are accidentally mistaken 
for stochastic processes. For the validity of Prof. Fitza’s argumentation concering random 
effects influencing firm performance, this reasoning does not matter as figured before. 
However, in the thesis author’s view, both random effects and stochastic processes might exist 
and influence firm performance. 
Another second point of criticism addresses the mixing up of CEO, firm and time. In many 
studies, only a static look is taken at the CEO performance effect. The before mentioned study 
conducted by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) tries to overcome this limitation by tracking CEOs 
over time and firms to capture year and firm fixed effects in a more sophisticated way compared 
to studies which only control through the respective fixed effects dummy variables. Blettner, 
Chaddad, & Bettis (2012), however, argue that this study omits the increase in experience of 
individual CEOs and the possibility that only specific types of firms hire external CEOs.  
Moreover, although Bertrand and Schoar (2003) measure year fixed effects, these effects only 
represents a sample average. It might very well be that the impact of time is different for 
different firms. For instance, a fall of commodity prices in a certain time period might be 
positive for one type of firm, but negative for another. This interaction is not accounted for in 
most models using time fixed effects. According to Blettner, Chaddad, & Bettis (2012) this 
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would nearly be impossible as sucg interaction terms exponentially increase for each added 
CEO to the panel data set.  
Finally, one of the biggest limitations which the CEO performance effect faces is the interaction 
between its sources. Many independent variables used in literature have causal relationships 
between each other. Also, independent variables are often used as dependent variables in other 
studies. Hence, due to this complex system of interactions, studying a simple relationship 
between a couple of variables and CEO performance will only partly capture the source of their 
impact.  
Therefore, those complex interdependencies among explanatory variables might blur the origin 
of causality of the CEO performance effect. To take this reasoning one step further, one could 
add to this network of causalities and reverse causalities of explanatory variables a time 
dimension. Naturally, it would take a specific amount of time for one independent variable, e.g. 
CAPEX, to affect another variable, e.g. cash holdings. This means that the not only the systemic 
origin of the performance effect of a specific variable could be unclear, but also the time of 
origin.  
As these three valid points of criticism come together in real world analysis, it becomes obvious 
that is it extremely difficult to reliably determine the exact impact of individual CEO 
characteristics or actions on firm performance. However, as elaborated on in this thesis, 
aggregate research provides a valuable framework of cause and effect between CEO and firm 
characteristics.  
 
7.1. Time lags 
 
As it was mentioned before, time lags between CEO action and effect on firm performance are 
a major issue in literature. Since the influential study of Lieberson & O'Connor (1972) they 
have been a major point of criticism and are frequently accounted for in relevant studies.  
Fixed effects might be biased due to the lagging effect of measures taken by previous managers. 
It is hard to determine whether the level of current performance is due to actions taken before 
the tenure of the actual CEO. Hence, a currently high variability of returns might be the outcome 
of previous measures and not be attributable to current management. Therefore, the implied 
effect of CEO actions on future performance should be considered, which, however, is 
extremely complex. The time lag of effects of actions taken by CEOs and effects on the 
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company, usually is estimated to amount at least to three years (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). Also, 
this lag effect may variate over firms and industries (Címerová, 2012). However, considering 
lagged performance measures still does not resolve this problem and continues to presume that 
a measured CEO effect is caused by a single CEO. On the contrary, aggregate CEO effect for 
a given observation of performance may be partially compromised of past and present CEOs’ 
actions, while the present CEO partially influences future performance. Controlling for the 
current CEO would, hence, underestimate its effect. 
Albeit taking into account these time dynamic properties, time lagged effects are certainly not 
a homogenous measure, they might differ among organizations, time period, type of 
management action taken, etc. Most researchers assume an about two to four-year time lag. 
However, none of the research studied for the purpose of this thesis, elaborates on the different 
type of time lags according to the various independent factors declared before, or how to 
account for them. For instance, some CEO decisions such as dividend policy have an immediate 
impact on specific firm performance variables, while others such as increased R&D spending 
might take up to 10 years to manifest in performance. This fragmented view of time lag would, 
hence, add another dimension to the cumulative view of time lags and would be a novel 
approach of investigation.  
Nevertheless, this should not be seen as threat to the validity of existing findings as accounting 




Another main obstacle in current research is that in many studies, industry and firm effects 
could be overestimated compared to the CEO effect (Mackey, 2008). This roots in the 
problematic methodology in research, which does not account for so-called “nesting” effects. 
Nesting basically means that one independent variable draws away explanatory power from 
another, i.e. some of the variable’s effect in “nested” in the other one. In particular, many studies 
include companies in their sample, which have never changed the CEO, and CEOs, which have 
never changed the firm. As a result, CEO effects would often be mistakenly measured as firm 
or industry effects.  
Bertrand & Schoar (2003), however, use a panel data set of CEOs and only track those who do 
switch firms at least one time and are observable in at least another firm to find CEO effects on 
an individual CEO level. This does exclude firms, which only employ one CEO in their 
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observation period. As Bertrand & Schoar (2003) impose such strict limitations on CEO 
characteristics such as position switching and having served at least three years as CEO, it is 
likely that further restrictions would facilitate selection bias, as also acknowledged by the 
authors themselves.  
Nesting will also be an issue when there is large correlation between explanatory factors. This 
is certainly the case between companies and industries (McGahan & Porter, 1997). As described 
in section 3.1.3, simultaneous ANOVA is effective in accounting for this effect. However, if 
the sequence of entry is carefully minded in variance decomposition analysis, the choice of the 
model will not vastly change results Fitza (2014). To have a widespread dataset with as many 
CEO movements as possible is an effective measure to limit nesting effects. 




















8. Empirical part  
 
The following sections represent the empirical part of this master’s thesis. Following existing 
and previously presented literature on measuring the CEO impact on firm performance, the 
study is organized in a very straight forward way. The main question this study aims to answer 
is, to what level time, industry, firm and CEO specific fixed effects influence firm performance 
in the timespan 1992 to 2016. These specific sources affecting firm performance are found at 
levels consistent with existing literature through employing well-established empirical 




As a first step, annual data on company executives is drawn from Execucomp database for the 
years 1992 to 2016. As sample restriction, only companies which are members of the S&P 500, 
S&P 400 and S&P 600 are represented in the sample. This covers all major 1500 U.S. firms, 
from large to small market capitalizations. The rationale behind this is to include only firms, 
which are of sufficient size to fulfill reporting and going concern criteria, which is in line with 
other authors (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003), (Dezsö & Ross, 2008).  
In total, information on 3,073 executives of 1,497 distinct firms is collected via Execucomp 
with a total of 24,238 observations. As a second step, a list of these distinct company is used as 
selection criterion for attaining a broad range of firm characteristics on those companies from 
Compustat, resulting in a total of 31,490 observations.  
Naturally, yearly information on companies derived from the Execucomp and Compustat 
database does not exactly match, in most cases information available at Compustat covers a 
longer timeframe than data derived from Execucomp. Therefore, a VBA routine in Microsoft® 
Excel® is employed to create a firm-year matched panel data set of company and executive 
characteristics.  
This results in information on all initially selected 1,497 firms with a total of 24,071 
observations. As further steps, consistency checks are conducted on the data set, as well as a 
second routine, which marks years with “1” if a respective year represents a CEO change and 
with “0” otherwise. Years in which this information is unavailable, i.e. the first year of a specific 
firm observation period, are left blank.  
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Finally, the dataset is cleaned according to measures taken by previous literature. Firstly, all 
companies with SIC codes starting with 60 to 69 (financial industry) are removed, which tend 
to cause arbitrary results (Címerová, 2012). This leads to an exclusion of 4,406 observations. 
Moreover, 58 firm-year observations reporting no information on performance indicators are 
removed from the dataset. The final dataset is comprised of 1170 distinct companies represented 
by 19,607 observations.  
Further cleaning or truncation measures are not conducted, as the data already represents a very 
well selected sample of S&P 1500 firms. Further exclusion of, for instance, companies below 
a certain size could bias the results in that among other issues, selection bias could be induced.  
 
8.2. Data Description 
 
This section describes in detail the final data set including all variables of interest. Table 2 
shows descriptive statistics for the dataset.  
Dependent variables are firm performance measures represented by return on assets. As 
previously outlined, this variable suffers from specific drawbacks, but nevertheless is used as 
main dependent variable by the majority of studies reviewed for the purpose of this thesis. In 
order to be of best comparability to other studies, return on assets is employed as dependent 
variable.  
However, to mitigate some of the major weaknesses, the variable is measured in two ways. In 
the first case, EBITDA serves as numerator and total assets as denominator, in the second case 
pre-tax profit serves as numerator, the denominator remains unchanged. While the latter method 
represents the usual measure of return on assets, the former ignores differences in capital 
structure as EBITDA is commonly seen as proxy for operating cash flow disregarding interest 
payments, depreciation and amortization as well as taxes payable.  
In the author’s view, considering this measure of return on assets makes companies more 
comparable. Capital structure often is a strategic decision, which should not be accounted for 
when comparing firm performance. Also, as measures of capital structure such as leverage are 
frequently used as independent variables, endogeneity issues could arise, as capital structure 
would also be reflected in return on assets based on net profit or pretax income.   
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Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return on Assets Compustat 19,607 19,603 14.89 10.20 -253.92 100.11 
(EBITDA based)        
Return on Assets Compustat 19,607 19,607 8.48 13.88 -577.60 115.33 
(Profit based)        
Years Compustat 19,607 25     
Industries Compustat 19,607 286     
Companies Compustat 19,607 1,170     
    Assets Compustat 19,607 19,449 9,933.28 33,145.14 4.83 797,769.00 
    CAPEX Compustat 19,512 16,882 517.47 1,760.42 -330.00 37,985.00 
as % of assets  19,481 19,477 5.70 5.64 -3.27 81.53 
    OPEX Compustat 19,607 19,312 6,423.86 19,477.77 0.68 448,909.00 
as % of assets  19,607 19,607 96.62 77.75 0.17 1,583.13 
    Employees Compustat 19,439 8,091 27.05 79.23 0 2,300.00 
as % of assets  19,439 19,434 0.71 2.56 0 117.01 
    Leverage  19,607 19,565 33.31 9.75 0 89.63 
CEOs ExecuComp 19,607 3,073     
    Age  ExecuComp 19,073 70 56.22 7.38 27 96 
    Total Salary ExecuComp 19,502 19,312 5,752.11 10,502.62 0 655,448.00 
as % of assets  19,487 19,487 299.48 820.15 0 66,643.75 
    Ownership  ExecuComp 13,647 4,197 3.41 7.50 0 87.60 
CEO Change   18,464 2 0.10 0.31 0 1 




It is found that return on assets based on EBITDA shows superior results compared to return 
on assets based on pretax income, hence results on the latter variable are not reported.  
Independent variables are year effects, represented by a year dummy for each year 1992 to 
2016, industry effects, represented by an industry dummy for each four digits SIC code, 
company effects, represented by a company dummy for each individual company and CEO 
effects, represented by a CEO dummy for each company CEO combination.  
Further, time variable independent variables are added on the firm and CEO level. Capital 
expenditures (CAPEX), operational expenditures (OPEX), the number of employees within a 
firm as well as total CEO salary are scaled on company size (total assets). Those variables are 
highly correlated with firm size; hence it is important to scale them, otherwise they would act 
as additional proxies for firm size.  
CEO change is a binary variable indicating a CEO change (“1”) in a given year within a given 
company. A correlation table for the variables is provided below in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix  






/Assets Leverage Age Salary Ownership 
CEO 
Change 
RoA 1          
Size -0.05 1         
Capex/Assets 0.156 -0.021 1        
Opex/Assets 0.125 -0.125 -0.05 1       
Staff/Assets 0.083 -0.061 0.049 0.29 1      
Leverage -0.117 0.138 -0.019 0.057 -0.028 1     
CEO Age -0.002 0.063 -0.013 -0.004 0.027 0.033 1    
Salary 0.024 -0.082 0.013 0.071 0.027 -0.137 -0.061 1   
Ownership 0.062 -0.025 0.053 0.076 0.133 -0.153 0.142 0.001 1  





The empirical method used is similar to previous work in variance decomposition. It is 
presumed that total variance of return on asset can be explained broadly by four levels of effect. 
These are year, industry, firm and leadership effects as outlined in chapter 2. Leadership effect 
is narrowed to the CEO effect. The final equation denotes as follows: 
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(1) 
The left-hand side represents return on assets for each company c, in industry i, in year y. On 
the right-hand side, µ is the average return on assets over the whole sample, while ϒ, α, β, φ, 
represent respectively the difference of µ to each factors level’s average of year-, industry-, 
company- or CEO-specific return on assets. The residual ε denotes the error term.  
Four stages of ANOVA analysis are conducted, while the respective increase in in explanatory 
power as total R-squared is noted. To estimate year effects, an ANOVA is run on return on 
assets and the factor year. Similarly, to estimate industry effects, the factor industry consisting 
of the four digits SIC code is added to the model. This is done in an analogous manner for 
company and CEO effects.  
The next section presents the main findings of this study and section 8.5. relates those to 
previous findings as well as expands the model.    
 
8.4. Empirical Findings 
 
Table 4 presents the relative increase as 
well as the absolute value of R² for 
each effect on return on assets based on 
EBITDA. Year effects are found to 
account for 1.6% of total return on 
asset variance, industry effects for 18.4%, company effects for 31.6 % and CEO effects of 
15.7%. All effects are highly significant at the 1% level.  
A total of 67.3% of variance in performance is explained by the model, which is a reasonable 
high number and consequently leaves 32.7% of variance unexplained.  
To determine the importance of the unexplained variance, it is necessary to investigate whether 
there are omitted effects in the model. If, on the contrary, all remaining unexplained variance 
in performance is attributable to sheer random factors, then the model would cover all relevant 
explanatory variables. This, however, is highly unlikely and content for discussion in further 
research.  
Table 4. Results from equation (1)  
Effect in % Increase in R² Total R² F-Stat 
Year effect 1.6 1.6 14.29*** 
Industry effect 18.4 20.0 11.78*** 
Company effect 31.6 51.6 9.31*** 
CEO effect 15.7 67.3 4.17*** 
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Existing literature draws a clear picture on validity on above results. Table 5 compares the 
thesis’ results with previous literature. In doing so it becomes obvious that the results are in 
strong line with existing literature.  
The second column of Table 5 presents averages for existing finings. These selected studies all 
use return of assets as dependent variable and sequential variance decomposition as empirical 
method. Some studies listed in Table 5 use different estimation methods or tightly restricted 
samples as an extension. Those results are covered in more detail in Table 1.  
Year effects are commonly known to be highly significant, but to only explain a small share in 
performance variation, as deeper factors have much more impact on individual performance 
than effects common to all sample companies such as inflation. Industry effects differ between 
studies, as measurements differ. Fitza 2014, for instance used three-digit SIC codes as fixed 
factor levels, while other use major industry groups (first two digits). The present study 
employed all four classification levels of SIC codes and found that using this most detailed 
industry description, resulted in the largest industry effect. This indicates that even within 
narrowly defined industry groups, large heterogeneity exists.  
 
























Year  1.6 2.2 1.8 2.4 5.6 2.6 3.6 1.0 2.0 
Industry  18.4 15.4 28.5 20.5 N/A 6.3 11.8 18.0 7.3 
Company  31.6 29.3 22.6 45.8 83.2 25.5 19.1 29.5 33.4 
CEO  15.7 13.7 14.5 8.7 5.7 14.7 13.4 12.9 17.7 
Residual  32.7 39.4 32.6 22.6 5.5 50.9 52.1 38.6 39.6 
1 The average takes into account all previous studies listed in the table, except Thomas (1988), who uses an extremely 
restricted sample for the purpose of residual minimization.  
2 For Thomas (1988) no industry is reported as his sample is limited to a single industry. 
3 Mackey conducts both simultaneous and sequential ANOVA. In the table, the results for sequential ANOVA are shown 
for better comparability. 
 
The company or firm level effect equals previous results average very much, as fixed effects 
often are estimated by considering firm identification as factor. CEO effect also strongly reflects 
research consensus. Similar to company effects, CEO IDs are used as factor variables. Most 
studies add to those fixed effects controls time variable terms as done in section 8.5. It shows, 
however, that doing so only results in slightly improved explanatory power. Greater deviation 
from the findings reported in Table 5 are achieved, when using different estimation methods or 
employing complex data gathering such as tracking individual CEOs.  
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Using other estimation methods, such as simultaneous ANOVA estimation (Mackey 2008), the 
result is an even increased CEO effect. Hence, it can be confirmed that the thesis’ findings on 
the CEO effect are in line with similar previous research, which also represent an empirical 




The previous section was based on time invariant factors. As other factors are expected to be 
hidden in the unexplained variance, this section expands the model by adding time varying 
variables. Those variables are unlike fixed company or CEO level controls not static and change 
over time. Naturally such variables are of continuous form and, hence, cannot be used in 
ANOVA estimation models, which deals with categorical variables exclusively. It is expected 
that time fixed effects are not able to explain all variation of firm performance, hence extending 
the model by time variable terms should increase total explanatory power. 
For this purpose, a linear regression model is set up as some of the added variables are of 
continuous form. The final regression equation reads as follows:  
 













+ + , + , ,  (2) 
 
Company characteristics are denoted by the terms β1 to β5, α is the intercept. CEO 
characteristics are specified by β6 to β6, while the remaining terms represent year, industry, 
company and CEO dummy variables and ε denotes the residual. The variables Capex, Opex, 
Employees and Salary are scaled on Size (total assets) for relative comparability. A dummy 
indicating CEO change within a firm over the observation period is excluded in the results, as 
it is insignificant and adds minor explanatory power, while reducing sample size. This is 
because no value can be assessed to the first firm-year observations as no previous observation 
exists to indicate a CEO change. The ownership variable is omitted as well, because many firms 
do not report on CEO ownership, resulting in a strongly reduced sample size.  
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Table 6 reports the regression results of Equation (2). Year and industry effects remain the 
same, as no continuous variables were added to those levels of variance. It should be noted as 
outlined in section 3.1.2 that ANOVA and linear regression rely on the same least square 
principle and produce the same level of R². Each model presented in Table 6 includes the 
variables of the previous models, hence follows the same variance decomposition method as 
described in section 8.3.  
Company effects slightly increase from 31.6% to 33.13%, while the CEO effect slightly 
decreases from 15.7% to 15.33%. This outcome has several reasons. Concerning the increased 
company effect, it seems clear that additional time variable factors do play a role in overall 
explanatory power of the effects. Certainly, these are comprised of countless individual 
characteristics, and it might be challenging to find all variables of influence to either explain 
100% of firm performance variation or to reliably determine which level or unexplained 
variance is a result of random factors to rule out hidden factors.  
 
Table 6. Hierarchical linear regressions on return on assets 
Model Variable Coefficient T-Stat Increase in R² Total R² 
1 Year Dummy  1.63 1.63 
2 Industry Dummy  18.37 20 
 Size -0.00001*** -3.21   
 Capex/Size 0.17205*** 10.63   
 Opex/Size 0.01738*** 9.05   
 Employees/Size 0.20233*** 2.58   
 Leverage -0.20289*** -18.05   
3 Company Dummy  33.13 53.13 
 Salary/Assets 0.00039*** 4.51   
4 CEO Dummy   15.33 68.46 
 Intercept  18.34*** 2.92   
 
That the CEO effect slightly decreases could be due to nesting effects as strongly emphasized 
by Mackey (2008). Specifically, this means that the more detailed specification of company 
effects potentially draws away explanatory power of the CEO effect. Company characteristics 
such as capital expenditure are also strategic decisions made by the CEO, which now could 
partly be reattributed to the company level. Adding too many variables to explain effects on 
firm performance can lead to overspecification causing arbitrary results.  
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Looking at the regressor coefficients also gives a clear picture. All coefficients are significant 
at the 99% level. A 1% increase in a specific regressor leads, ceteris paribus, to a percentage 
change in return on assets of the regressors value. Capex and employee size are positively 
associated with return on assets. An increase in leverage, on the contrary, negatively affects 
performance due to higher default risk, a commonly known issue in corporate finance literature.  
However, it is clear that the changes in company and CEO effects are extremely minor despite 




As a measure of causality, a lagged performance variable is introduced. As described in section 
7.1, it can be assumed that CEO measures take some time to have an impact on firm 
performance. Table 7 reports the results of both one-year and three-year lagged returns on 
assets.  
 
Table 7. Results from equation (1)     
 1-year lagged ROA  3-year lagged ROA  
Effect in % Increase in R² Total R² F-Stat Increase in R² Total R² F-Stat 
Year effect 1.6 1.6 14.56*** 1.7 1.7 14.97*** 
Industry effect 18.6 20.2 11.51*** 19.9 21.6 12.16*** 
Company effect 32.5 52.7 9.26*** 35.5 57.1 9.02*** 
CEO effect 14.8 67.5 3.87*** 11.0 68.1 2.85*** 
 
As expected, year, industry and company effects are not much affected. When interpreting the 
results, it has to be noted that total observation decreases from 19,607 in the original sample to 
18,437 in the sample for a one-year time lag and to 16,114 in the sample for a three-year time 
lag. This is because depending on the lag, either the first one year or three years must be omitted 
for each company observation. As a result, decreasing CEO effects might be due to that issue. 
It clearly shows, however, that a one-year lagged performance measure does not substantially 
impact the CEO effect.  
Lagged performance measures are no perfect causality proofs, but give a strong indication. As 
stated before, it can be assumed that the CEO effect impacts firm performance in an individual 
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and continuous form, hence, it is difficult to define a single year representing the whole effect 
of CEOs within a sample.  
 
8.5.2. Robustness  
 
 The previous two sections already indicate robustness through extending the model and 
through using a time lagged performance measure. The ultimate robustness test is modelled, 
however, according to the arguments of Fitza (2014). It is assumed that the distribution of return 
on assets in the sample is purely based on random factors. To implement this, the original model 
as represented by equation (1) is changed in that the dependent variable, return on assets, is 
replaced by a random distribution of this sample. This ensures that the mean and standard 
deviation of the variable remains equal. Repeating variance decomposition through ANOVA 
as in the base model should yield the effects of each factor attributable to pure chance. As in 
detail described in section 3.1.4. it is expected that year, industry and company effects are low 
as many observations exists for those factors. The CEO effect should not equal or exceed the 
level previously estimated, otherwise it cannot reliably be stated that the CEO effect is not based 
on random effects. Table 8 presents the results. 
 
Table 8. Results from equation (1) based on a random sample  
 Based on Random Sample  Random Sample Fitza (2014) 
Effect in % Increase in R² Total R² F-Stat Increase in R² Total R² 
Year effect 0.1 0.1 0.87 0.1 0.1 
Industry effect 1.5 1.6 0.81 1.2 1.3 
Company effect 4.9 6.5 1.36*** 7.3 8.6 
CEO effect 11.3 17.8 1.20*** 13.8 22.4 
 
The results behave has expected. Year and industry effects are low and highly insignificant. 
About 4.9% in random firm performance variation is explained by the company effect and 
11.3% by CEO the effects. These numbers are coherent with Fitza (2014), who uses a similar 
sample with, however, tighter restrictions. What is more important than the absolute value of 
those results, is the relation to the fixed effects model estimated before. In this regard, the 
difference between fixed effects and random effects is 4.4% for the CEO performance effect, 
compared to 4% measured by Fitza (2014). This level is found to be high enough to reject the 
hypotheses that the CEO effect is purely based on random effects, captured by the model.  
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Noteworthy, the absolute CEO effect of a certain sample surely differs according to the variable 
and sample selection, average CEO tenure, etc. However, Fitza (2014) continuously finds that 
fixed CEO effects exceed random effects by about 4% to 5%, representing the real fixed effect 
level of CEO impact. Summarizing the empirical part of this thesis, the CEO effect could be 
estimated at a level consistent with past literature and is confirmed by well-established 
robustness checks.  
 
9. Conclusion  
 
The present master’s thesis effectively answers the research question whether the identities of 
managers matter for corporate performance. Through extensive literature review a framework 
based on theoretical and empirical research could be built, which provides a foundation to 
explain the importance of leadership among varying settings and within diverse company types.  
Furthermore, through conducting deep research on existing findings as well as conducting an 
own empirical study on a large and representative sample, it could be shown that the direct 
influence of the CEO position on firm performance is large and significant. Through extending 
the base model the validity of the findings is strongly supported. Moreover, based on literature, 
an in-depth analysis on individual leader characteristics draws a clear picture of personal key 
drivers, which affect firm performance.  
This thesis is also intended to serve as guidance for further research on the topic, as common 
theories and empirical practices including their advantages and drawbacks are defined in detail 
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